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TAKING THE SIZZLE OUT OF THE FRYE RULE: DAUBERT
V. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS OPENS THE
DOOR TO NOVEL EXPERT TESTIMONY
A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its
opponents and making them see the light, but rather because
its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up
that is familiar with it.
-Max Planck'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Frye v. United States,2 the Court of Appeals of the Dis-
trict of Columbia affirmed a trial court's exclusion of lie detec-
tor test results on the ground that such tests had not been
"generally accepted" by the scientific community. The Frye rule,
or "general acceptance" standard, quickly became the dominant
test for the admission of scientific evidence. Decided in 1923,
Frye governed evidentiary decisions in a majority of federal
circuits for the next seventy years. The adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975, however, prompted several judges to
question the validity of Frye. Since the enactment of the Rules
debate has surrounded the standards governing the admissibili-
ty of expert testimony.
The United States Supreme Court ended the debate in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.3 The Court unani-
mously held that the Frye "general acceptance" standard was no
longer the appropriate test for deciding the admissibility of
expert evidence, adding that the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence superseded Frye. Instead, the Court found "cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful in-
1. MAX PLANCK, ScIENTIFIc AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER PAPERS 33-34 (Frank
Gaynor trans., 1950), reprinted in RESPECTFULLY QUOTED 313 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989).
2. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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struction on the burden of proof; . . . rather than wholesale ex-
clusion under an uncompromising 'general acceptance' test," to
be the appropriate means for challenging evidence.4
This Casenote examines the development of the admissibility
of expert opinion over the past seventy years. Specifically, part
two of this Casenote explores the dominant common law rule
for admitting expert opinion, the Frye "general acceptance" test,
and details the jurisdictional split over the applicability of this
doctrine. Part three focuses on the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and explores the impact of the Federal Rules
on the common law theories of admissibility. Part four is an
overview of the Daubert decision, exploring the lower court and
Supreme Court opinions in the case. Finally, part five considers
the potential impact of the Daubert opinion.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY UNDER
COMMON LAW
A. "General Acceptance" Standard
In 1923, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia up-
held the exclusion of the results from a systolic blood pressure
deception test, a precursor to modern lie detector tests, in Frye
v. United States.5 In a notably brief opinion, which cited no
authority, the court successfully curtailed the admission of
novel scientific evidence in criminal and civil trials for decades
to follow. While the United States Supreme Court never en-
dorsed the Frye decision, a majority of federal courts" followed
the ruling. The case has been cited most frequently for its lan-
guage regarding the "general acceptance" of scientific princi-
ples:6
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is diffi-
cult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the eviden-
tial force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
4. Id. at 2798.
5. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
6. See Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative
to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 547 n.11 (1984).
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deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or dis-
covery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs.!
This legal theory has been used to exclude expert testimony
regarding such novel scientific fields as "[plolygraphy, grapholo-
gy, hypnotic and drug induced testimony, voice stress analysis,
voice spectrograms, ion microprobe mass spectroscopy, infrared
sensing of aircraft, retesting of breath samples for alcohol con-
tent, psychological profiles of battered women and child abus-
ers, post traumatic stress disorder as indicating rape, astronom-
ical calculations, and blood group typing."8 The Frye rule was
fashioned to "shield jurors from the influence of testimony that
might sound more impressive than it actually is."9 The "general
acceptance" standard forced trial courts to bar the testimony of
expert witnesses who were unable to garner peer support for
their novel theories, rather than risk consideration of such
evidence by a jury.
B. Division over Frye
Although followed by some courts for more than seventy
years, the Frye rule has been heavily criticized." One commen-
7. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
8. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at .363 (4th ed.
1992).
9. Moenssens, supra note 6, at 546. He adds that "[many courts favor a conser-
vative approach because juries may be overly impressed by experts with seemingly
impressive credentials. Additionally, juries may give greater weight to expert opinions
than the opinions deserve on the basis of scientific validity." Id.
10. See BROUN et. al., supra note 8, § 203, at 363-64 leading the criticism:
Most commentators agree, however, that these objectives can be attained
satisfactorily with less drastic constraints on the admissibility of scientific
evidence. In particular, it has been suggested that a substantial accep-
tance test be substituted for the general acceptance standard, that courts
look directly to reliability or validity rather than to the extent of accep-
tance, that scientific evidence be admitted freely, coupled with testimony
of an expert appointed by the court if it finds that the testimony would
be subject to "substantial doubt in peer review by the scientific commu-
nity," that a panel of scientists rather than the usual courts screen new
developments for acceptance, and that the traditional standards of rele-
vancy and the need for expertise-and nothing more-should govern.
Id. at 363.
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tator described the rule as "easier to state than apply."1 An-
other author wrote that Frye "excludes recent yet valid scien-
tific findings from the fact finding process and ... determines
scientific reliability based on 'nose counting.'"' Commentators
also blamed Frye for impeding scientific development. "It has
been argued that scientific expert witnesses, by the very nature
of the legal process, have been forced to assume a role which
compromises the very essence of scientific impartiality. It would
appear that this has largely been the consequence of the con-
sensual standard put forward in Frye.""
Criticism of the Frye test has not been confined to scholarly
writings. Members of the judiciary debated the validity of the
rule as well. Several courts renounced the "general acceptance"
rule completely."4 Even courts applying Frye have noted its
weaknesses. "For example, the D.C. Circuit-in which the Frye
test originated--observed that Frye tended to retard the admis-
sion of proof derived from novel methods of scientific investiga-
tion .... 15
The Daubert decision ended the jurisdictional split over the
applicability of the "general acceptance" standard. Before
Daubert, a majority of the federal circuits followed the rule set
out in Frye v. United States. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit ruled that Frye was a proper standard for de-
clining the, admissibility of expert testimony in United States v.
Two Bulls.6 The court rationalized that "[riegardless of which
rule may be followed, . . . Rule 702 and Frye both require the
same general approach to the admissibility of new scientific evi-
dence. Neither rule should permit speculative and conjectural
testing which fails normal foundational requirements necessary
for the admissibility of scientific testimony or opinion.""
11. Moenssens, supra note 6, at 548.
12. Steven J. Grossman & Christopher K. Gagne, Science and Scientific Evidence
II, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1053, 1055 (1993) (citation omitted).
13. Id. at 1064 (citation omitted).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 32-38.
15. William D. Quarles, High Court States Flexible Standard for the Admission of
Expert Testimony, INSIDE LriG., Aug. 1993, at 16 (citing United States v. Addison,
498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
16. 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990).
17. Id. at 60.
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The Fifth Circuit relied on Frye to exclude expert testimony
regarding the alleged cause of the plaintiffs cancer in
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.8 Holding that the "Frye
question focuses on the proffered methodology alone and looks
to the scientific community to determine if general support for
that methodology exists," the court concluded that "Dr. Miller's
presumption... has no support in medical science and...
failed to clear either the Rule 703 or the Frye hurdle."9
In United States v. Smith,2" the Seventh Circuit cited Frye
when reversing the trial court's admission of spectrographic
voice identification. The court confirmed that "[a]lthough the
validity of the judge-made rule in Frye has been criticized by
some courts and commentators for numerous reasons, this cir-
cuit has continued to affirm (and to apply) the Frye
standard."2'
The Sixth Circuit also ruled that Frye was controlling in
United States v. MetzgerY The defendant challenged testimony
regarding the use of thin-layer chromatography to discover
trace amounts of dynamite. The court ruled that the evidence
had been admitted properly because it met the "general accep-
tance" standard articulated in Frye.'
Frye was the governing standard in United States v.
Smith,' decided by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit followed suit, applying the "general accep-
tance" standard in United States v. Julio Piccinonna.'
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit excluded
expert testimony in Daubert on the grounds that the evidence
was not "generally accepted" in the scientific community. This
decision, however, was overturned by the Supreme Court.26
18. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
19. Id. at 1115-16.
20. 869 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1989).
21. Id. at 351.
22. 778 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986).
23. Id. at 1203-04.
24. 776 F.2d 892, 898 (10th Cir. 1985).
25. 885 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1989).
26. 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
535
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In contrast, several other jurisdictions refused to apply the
Frye "general acceptance" test in all cases. In United States v.
Jakobetz,"7 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the trial court had properly admitted evidence of DNA
analysis. The court cited United States v. Williams,' in which
it ruled that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye."9
The court concluded that a more liberal approach to admitting
scientific evidence was appropriate."0
The Third Circuit also ruled that Frye was an improper stan-
dard in DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals."' The court
permitted an expert witness to testify to epidemiological studies
linking birth defects to the morning sickness drug manufac-
tured by the defendant.3 2 The court reasoned:
In Downing, we explicitly rejected reliance upon the "gener-
al acceptance" test of admissibility, most prominently ar-
ticulated in Frye v. United States .... We did so, for
among other reasons, because the general acceptance test
was too vague and malleable to yield consistent results, and
because its nose-counting emphasis often led to the exclu-
sion of helpful evidence in contradiction to the spirit of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.33
While the Fourth Circuit has not renounced the Frye rule
entirely, it has avoided its application. In Ellis v. International
Playtex, Inc.,"4 the court considered the admissibility of
plaintiffs scientific data under the hearsay rule, and avoided
scrutinizing the evidence under Frye.
[Bly applying 803(8)(C) and thus requiring Playtex to chal-
lenge the credibility of the reports before the jury and not
the judge, our decision today creates a result that permits
the trial court and the litigants to skirt the difficulties
27. 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).
28. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
29. Id. at 1198.
30. 955 F.2d at 794, 796.
31. 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990).
32. Id. at 949, 956.
33. Id. at 955.
34. 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984).
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posed by Frye without sacrificing the continued survival of
the rule.'
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. Federal Rules 702 and 703
In 1975 Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Specifically Rules 702 and 703 address the admissibility of
expert opinion. The Rules do not codify the "general acceptance"
language of Frye. Instead, the Rules modify common law princi-
ples of evidence by liberalizing the restrictions on expert testi-
mony.3" Moreover, Rule 402 expressly provides that "all rele-
vant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to statutory authority."" Many commentators, as well as
the plaintiffs in the Daubert case, 8 have argued that excluding
relevant evidence solely on the ground that the expert opinion
is not "generally accepted" violates Rule 402 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.39
Rule 702 governs the admission of testimony by expert wit-
nesses. The Rule provides "[i]f a scientific, technical, or other
35. Id. at 304. "Although this court has expressed concern over the Frye rule, we
have continued to recognize its validity in certain circumstances." Id. at 304 n.15
(citing United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1984)).
36. See Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or 'Reasonably Reliable"? Analyzing
the Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 350, 354 (1992). "Although Rule 702 did not significantly depart
from the common law, when combined with the other rules governing expert testimo-
ny, particularly Rule 703, 'the door to expert testimony [was] opened far wider than
before.' Id. (citing 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL Evi-
DENCE § 380, at 633 (1979)).
37. FED. R. EvID. 402.
38. See, e.g., Petitioners' Brief at 19, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102).
39. See Quarles, supra note 15, at 17. "A particularly restrictive technique for
enforcing Frye's general acceptance requirement was a heightened relevancy standard
that directly contradicts the Federal Rules' sweeping presumption of admissibility for
relevant evidence: with clearly delineated exceptions '(a)U relevant evidence is admis-
sible.'" Id.
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specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise."" The "general acceptance" language emphasized in Frye
does not appear in Rule 702 or in the comments following the
rule. Rule 702 clearly requires that expert testimony be helpful,
but it does not require that it be "generally accepted." One
practicing litigator argues that "Rule 702 embodies an inclusive
approach to expert witnesses that emphasizes a pragmatic con-
sideration whether proffered evidence would assist the fact-
finder and de-emphasizes narrow, formal requirements."4'
Rule 703 addresses the bases of opinion testimony by expert
witnesses. First, the Rule provides that an expert may base his
opinion on "facts or data ... perceived by or made known to
[him] at or before the hearing."42 Additionally, the Rule notes
that "[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the sub-
ject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.""
The Rule permits an expert to base his opinions on inadmissi-
ble evidence, provided the evidence is "reasonably relied" on by
members of the field. The Rule does not, however, expressly
require that the substance of an expert's testimony be "general-
ly accepted" by the scientific community.
B. Impact of Federal Rules on Frye
Following the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
many commentators argued that Frye had been overturned,"
reasoning that:
These rules do not explicitly distinguish between scientific
and other forms of expert testimony, and they permit ex-
perts to rely on facts or data not otherwise admissible into
40. FED. R. EVID. 702.
41. Quarles, supra note 15, at 17.
42. FED. R. EVID. 703.
43. Id.
44. Quarles, supra note 15, at 17. "Proponents of a lower threshold for the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence discerned in the Federal Rules of Evidence a 'helpfulness'
standard for guiding the admissibility determination." Id. at 16.
538 [Vol. 28:531
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evidence as long as they are "reasonably relied upon by
experts in [the] particular field." Plainly, "reasonable reli-
ance" is not synonymous with general acceptance.45
Conversely, some commentators argued that the viability of the
Frye test was evidenced by its long survival.46
The courts remained divided, however, on the question of
whether the Frye rule and the Federal Rules of Evidence could
coexist. In Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.,47 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Frye rule was
incorporated into the Federal Rules." In United States v. Wil-
liams,49 however, the Second Circuit held that Frye was no
longer a viable test for determining the admissibility of a novel
scientific technique. The court upheld the use of spectrographic
voice analysis as a means of identifying a criminal defen-
dant.50
A determination of.reliability cannot rest solely on a process
of "counting (scientific) noses." . . . [Ulnanimity of opinion
in the scientific community, on virtually any scientific ques-
tion, is extremely rare. Only slightly less rare is a strong
majority. Doubtless, a technique unable to garner any sup-
port, or only minuscule support, within the scientific com-
munity would be found unreliable by a court. In testing for
admissibility of a particular type of scientific evidence,
whatever the scientific "voting" pattern may be, the courts
cannot in any event surrender to scientists the responsibili-
ty for determining the reliability of that evidence.51
Nearly twenty years after the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, the Supreme Court ended all speculation with its
decision in Daubert. While the "general acceptance" of a scien-
tific theory may be a factor in a court's overall determination of
45. BROUN et. al., supra note 8, § 203, at 363.
46. See James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A
Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, JuRImETRICS J., 1986, at 249. "The
general acceptance or Frye standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence has
been besieged and bombarded ever since its pronouncement in 1923, but it has with-
stood every scholarly, judicial, and legislative assault." Id.
47. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991)(en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
48. Id. at 1110.
49. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1117 (1979).
50. Id. at 1195.
51. Id. at 1198.
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admissibility, the Supreme Court declared that the Federal
Rules supersede the law of Frye v. United States.52
IV. DAUBERT V. MERRELL Dow PHARMACEUTICALS
A. The Lower Courts
In 1989, defendant Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals moved for
summary judgment in a personal injury suit filed on behalf of
infant plaintiffs Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller.53 Daubert
and Schuller were born with serious limb reduction birth de-
fects allegedly caused by their mothers' ingestion of Bendectin,
a drug prescribed to pregnant women for "morning sickness"
and manufactured by Merrell Dow.' The defendants success-
fully argued that there was no genuine issue of material fact
regarding causation.55 The defense submitted an affidavit from
a physician who concluded that Bendectin and birth defects
were not statistically related after he reviewed more than thirty
published studies on the matter." The plaintiffs. only expert
evidence, however, was based on animal tests and the reanaly-
sis of previously conducted studies." The court refused to ad-
mit testimony from the plaintiffs expert witnesses on the
grounds that the opinions did not stem from statistically signifi-
cant epidemiological studies.58 The court concluded that with-
out such studies, plaintiffs evidence was not sufficiently reliable
to pass the "general acceptance" test.59 Unable to meet this
evidentiary burden, the plaintiffs could not present a genuine
question linking the cause of Daubert and Schuller's injuries to
Bendectin:
Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 703, restricts the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence. "A necessary predicate to the
admission of scientific evidence is the principle upon which
52. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793 (1993).
53. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
54. Id. at 571.
55. Id.
56. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
57. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 574-75.
58. Id. at 575.
59. See id. at 572-75.
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it is based 'must be sufficiently established to have general
acceptance in the field to which it belongs.'" Therefore,
expert opinion not based on facts or data "of a type rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in the particular field" is not
helpful, but instead is confusing or misleading and should
therefore be excluded. "Whether an expert's opinion has an
adequate basis, and whether without it an evidentiary bur-
den has been met, are matters of law for the court to
decide."'
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court's award of summary judgment.6 Citing United
States v. Solomon,6" a Ninth Circuit decision which applied the
Frye rule, the court found that:
For expert opinion based on a given scientific methodology
to be admissible, the methodology cannot diverge signifi-
cantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authori-
ties in the field. If it does so diverge, it cannot be shown to
be "generally accepted as a reliable technique," and a dis-
trict court must exclude it.'
The court concluded that the reanalysis of epidemiological stud-
ies by the plaintiffs' witnesses was not an appropriate basis for
expert testimony.
[Tihe reanalysis of epidemiological studies is generally ac-
cepted by the scientific community only when it is subjected
to verification and scrutiny by others in the field. Plaintiffs'
reanalyses do not comply with this standard; they were
unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer review pro-
cess, and generated solely for use in litigation.'
60. Id. at 572 (quoting Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, 857 F.2d 823, 829 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Barrell of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire
and Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kilgus, 571
F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978)).
61. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
62. 753 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1985).
63. 951 F.2d at 1130 (citing United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th
Cir. 1985); Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1956)).
64. 951 F.2d at 1131 (citing Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epide-
miological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HAV. ENVTL. L. REV. 429,
438-39 (1983)).
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Despite the* persuasiveness of the reanalyses and animal tests
linking Bendectin with birth defects, the plaintiffs' expert evi-
dence was excluded. The Frye rule barred the plaintiffs from
making a prima facie case against the drug manufacturers.
B. The Supreme Court
In 1993 the Supreme Court granted certiorari "in light of
sharp divisions among the courts regarding the proper standard
for the admission of expert testimony."" The Court noted that
while "the 'general acceptance' test has been the dominant
standard" for more than seventy years, the jurisdictions were
still significantly divided on the issue.66 The Court specifically
cited to the division between the D.C. Circuit and the Third
Circuit on this matter. 7 The Court ended the debate, however,
ruling that the Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded the
Frye test.68
The Petitioners successfully argued that the district court had
improperly excluded expert evidence by deciding its admissibili-
ty under the Frye standards. The Court agreed that the "gener-
al acceptance" test was displaced by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Citing Federal Rule 402, the Court stressed
that "'[aill relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of
Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.'"69 Given that
the Federal Rules did not limit relevant evidence to that which
is "generally accepted," the Court ruled that the Frye standard
was not a conclusive factor for deciding the admissibility of
expert testimony.0
65. 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2792 (1993).
66. Id. at 2792-93.
67. Id. at 2792 (comparing United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (D.C.
Cir.) (following the "general acceptance" standard), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987)
with DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990) (re-
fusing to apply the "general acceptance" test)).
68. 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
69. Id. at 2793-94 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 402).
70. 113 S. Ct. at 2793-94.
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The Court also examined Federal Rule 702 governing expert
testimony. Again the Court found that the Federal Rules did
not embody the rigid Frye standard:
Nothing in the text of this Rules establishes "general accep-
tance" as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does
respondent present any clear indication that Rule 702 or
the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a "gener-
al acceptance" standard. The drafting history makes no
mention of Frye, and a rigid "general acceptance" re-
quirement would be at odds with the "liberal thrust" of the
Federal Rules and their "general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony." Given the Rules'
permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on
expert testimony that does not mention "general accep-
tance," the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated
Frye is unconvincing.7
The Court did not conclude, however, that expert evidence
could be admitted without any limitations. The justices con-
firmed that admissible scientific evidence must still be reliable
in addition to being relevant.72 Such a requirement, however,
is derived from the Federal Rules of Evidence, not United
States v. Frye.73
The primary locus of this obligation is Rule 702, which
clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the sub-
jects and theories about which an expert may testify ....
The subject of an expert's testimony must be "scientific...
knowledge." The adjective "scientific" implies a grounding in
the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word
"knowledge" connotes more than subjective belief or unsup-
ported speculation .... Of course, it would be unreasonable
to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be
71. Id. at 2794 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)
(citations omitted)).
72. 113 S. Ct. at 2794-95:
That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not
mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admis-
sibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial judge disabled
from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial
judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence ad-
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"known" to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in
science."
Finally, the Court held that a judge ruling on admissibility
may still consider the "general acceptance" of a scientific tech-
nique or theory.75 Relevant evidence is that which will "assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue."76 "General acceptance" may be a factor in a
judges' determination of the helpfulness of the evidence. The
results of such an inquiry are merely one factor, however, and
should not be dispositive.77 "The inquiry envisioned by Rule
702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one."7' The trial judge is to
act as a gatekeeper, screening out evidence that does not meet
the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Evidence
that does meet the federal guidelines, however, should be
admitted.
Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evi-
dence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are
the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence .... These conventional devices,
rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising
"general acceptance" test, are the appropriate safeguards
where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards
of Rule 702.79
V. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DAUBERT
Predictions about Daubert's impact vary. Not surprisingly, the
plaintiffs and defense bars disagree on the force of the Supreme
Court's ruling. Many defense attorneys believe the effects of the
decision will be minimal." One practitioner writes that
"[nlotwithstanding the apparently more relaxed standard for the
74. Id. (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 2797.
76. FED. R. EVID. 702.
77. 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2798 (citations omitted).
80. See Richard C. Reuben, Brave New World, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1993, at 31, for
an interview with David M. Harney, representing the plaintiff attorney's perspective,
and Raoul D. Kennedy, representing the views of defense attorneys.
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admissibility of expert testimony, it is unlikely that Daubert
will be of great consequence to most federal litigators."8' He
adds that "expert practice will continue to focus on those char-
acteristics that enhance or diminish the weight factfinders will
give to an expert's testimony rather than on indications that
the testimony is so inherently flawed that it lacks sufficient
reliability to be admitted."82
Critics of the Daubert decision have expressed concern that
the decision will permit unqualified experts to unduly influence
juries. Parties 'favoring the Frye rule question the ability of
judges to decide the reliability of scientific evidence without
more guidance.'m They also fear that unreliable "expert" testi-
mony will consume excessive amounts of time and money dur-
ing litigation.
Most of these concerns are unfounded. The Daubert Court
stressed that trial judges are still responsible for excluding
expert testimony that is not trustworthy or may unduly
prejudice the jury. The Court underscored that abandoning the
Frye rule would not lead to a "'free-for all' in which befuddled
juries are confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific
assertions."'
Additionally, the Court encouraged parties to seek summary
judgment to avoid excessive loss of time and money. The Court
responded to the defendants' apprehension on this matter by
confirming that "in the event the trial court concludes that the
scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insuffi-
cient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position
more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a
81. Quarles, supra note 15, at 19.
82. Id.
83. See Starrs, supra note 46, at 250:
Furthermore, not only might jury overreaction to scientific evidence be a
cause for a special rule of admissibility, but judges too need guidance in
the reception of scientific evidence. A distinct rule of admissibility for
scientific evidence will restrain both judge and jury from according an
undeserved hegemony to scientific evidence and will be an augury of and
an incentive for uniformity among the court in the acceptance of the
results of similar scientific analyses.
Id.
84. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993).
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judgment... and likewise to grant summary judgment." 5
Finally, the Daubert Court was confident that trial judges are
qualified to evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence without
a rigid "general acceptance" test.
Despite the potential for unreliable testimony, abolishing the
Frye rule should result in more informed decisions. Juries
should weigh expert evidence from both parties and dpcide
which is more persuasive, rather than only hear from the side
relying on the conventional scientific view. This approach pro-
motes scientific development.
The Daubert standard may also increase the efficiency of
litigation. A party relying on the "general acceptance" standard
would have had to present cumulative evidence from various
experts to show that a proffered theory prevailed in the scien-
tific community. Daubert avoids this waste of judicial resources.
Neither party is required to present redundant evidence in
order to satisfy a rigid admission standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
"The new federal standard for the admission of expert testi-
mony is a flexible test that emphasizes the trial court's
gatekeeping role and abandons general acceptance as a prereq-
uisite for the admission of scientific evidence.""6 Daubert gives
the judge the discretion to decide the admissibility of expert
testimony. This was the scheme originally envisioned by the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Judges are still free to consider the
factors initially expressed in Frye, but they are no longer
required to do so.
Such a flexible system leaves the door open for reliable and
helpful novel scientific techniques. Legal rules of evidence
should not stifle scientific development. Daubert encourages
novel scientific evidence, yet does not mandate the admission of
unreliable and irrelevant evidence. Reliability checks still exist.
Kimberly Ann Satterwhite
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. Quarles, supra note 15, at 16.
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